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ABSTRACT 
 
Decomposing the Wage Losses of Displaced Workers: 
The Role of the Reallocation of Workers into Firms and Job Titles* 
 
Using an unusually rich matched employer-employee-job title data set for Portugal, this paper 
evaluates the sources of wage losses of workers displaced due to firm closure based on the 
comparison of workers’ wages differentials before and after displacement. Potential wage 
losses of displaced workers can be related to firm, job title, and match heterogeneity in the 
pre- and post-displacement jobs. In this vein, we estimate a three-way high-dimensional fixed 
effects regression model that enables us to decompose the sources of the wage losses into 
the contribution of firm, job title, and match fixed effects. The worker-firm match plays a very 
sizable role. We found that the allocation of workers into poorer matches accounts for 38 
percent of the total average wage loss. Sorting among firms accounts for 36 percent. Job 
downgrading also plays a significant role in explaining the wage loss of displaced workers, 
accounting for the remaining 26 percent. 
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1 Introduction
Worker displacement is the subject of an extensive and growing literature.
The costs of job loss in terms of unemployment, future employment prospects,
and earnings-change have been the most studied aspects of job displacement.1
Focusing on the last of these, this paper provides a detailed decomposition of
the evolution of the earnings gap between displaced and non-displaced workers
into its most important dimensions - firm, job title, and match characteristics.
Understanding the causes of these reductions might shed some light on potential
policy options to ease the burden of adjustment on these workers, and should
offer additional empirical evidence regarding the “new monopsony” approach
of the labor market popularized by Manning (2003).
Earlier literature on the earnings impact of job displacement has now con-
vincingly established that displaced workers experience long-lasting reductions
in earnings (Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and von Wachter (2011)).
However, the mechanisms generating these losses is a matter of some con-
troversy. This study offers a novel evaluation of the sources of wage losses
incurred by workers displaced due to firm closure, having in mind that wages
in the previous job are a function of a set of worker characteristics (e.g., gen-
der, education, and experience) that are expected to yield, in general, the same
return on the previous job and in the labor market and a set of firm, job title,
and match characteristics that do not necessarily yield the same return in sub-
sequent jobs (Hamermesh (1987)). Indeed, if wages primarily reflect workers’
characteristics, then individual wages will be highly persistent, largely invari-
ant to where individuals work, and potential losses due to displacement will be
negligible. If, on the other hand, firm, job title, and match-specific heterogene-
ity are important, then the costs of displacement supported by workers could
be considerable.
It is well documented in the empirical literature on wage differentials drawn
from linked employer-employee data that observed and unobserved character-
istics of workers, firms, and worker-firm matches are important determinants
of wages (Abowd et al. (1999), Goux and Maurin (1999), Woodcock (2008),
and Torres et al. (2013)). Furthermore, firms seem to be quite heteroge-
nous in terms of their market power and wage compensation policies (Cardoso
(2000) and Webber (2013)). The existence of labor market frictions such as
imperfect information and mobility costs can explain the persistence of inter-
firm/inter-industry compensation differentials (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen
(1998)). These search frictions give firms monopsony power and the possibility
to offer a wage that deviates from the competitive market wage (Manning, 2003,
2011). Even in more centralized wage setting systems like the one prevailing in
Portugal, firms often deviate from the wage floor agreed at the collective bar-
1For enlightening reviews of the literature see Hamermesh (1989), Kletzer (1998) and
Carrington and Fallick (2014).
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gaining table for each category of workers, adjusting to firm-specific conditions
(Cardoso and Portugal (2005)).
The role of assortative matching is also likely to be relevant in the setting up
of our analysis. In this framework, it is important to distinguish a good worker
in a good firm from a good worker-firm match. In the event of a displacement,
a loss occurs if a high quality job match between the worker and the firm is
dissolved.2,3 Furthermore, match-specific human capital accumulated over the
course of the employment relationship is permanently destroyed when a job
separation occurs. Its value is lost for both - match participants and to the
society as a whole (Woodcock (2007)).
Moreover, accounting for match quality has important consequences in
terms of the econometric model specification. It is not sufficient to account
solely for worker and firm unobserved effects, as the omission of match ef-
fects biases the estimated returns to observed characteristics and the estimated
worker and firm fixed effects.4 In the current study we separate the role of the
quality of the match from the role of worker and firm permanent heterogeneity.
To account for occupational heterogeneity in the pre- and post-displacement
jobs, this study considers a third dimension of wage formation - job title het-
erogeneity. A major strength of our dataset is that it matches the workers with
their corresponding job titles. The identification of job titles is thorough and
reliable because it comes directly from the definition of wage floors settled by
collective bargaining. In a typical year around 30,000 wage floors are agreed
(Martins (2014) and Carneiro et al. (2014)). The detailed definition of the job
titles accounts for the complexity of the tasks, the hierarchical standing of the
worker, and the stressfulness of the working conditions. A displacement event
could lead to the loss of occupation-specific human capital due to the difficulty
of finding a job that uses existing skills optimally or due to the depreciation of
general and specific human capital during non-employment spells.5 It is worth
noting that human capital has a decisive role during the early phase of the
joblessness spell. It can be argued that larger human capital endowments are
associated with greater job opportunities and higher opportunity costs of un-
employment that necessarily erode with the progression of the unemployment
spell.
Earlier literature has sought to evaluate this effect by measuring specific
human capital based on tenure at the occupation, firm, and industry level.
2However, displacement might increase earnings. For instance, if displacement dissolves a
bad job match that was not perceived as such by the employee.
3See, among others, the studies of Abraham and Farber (1987, 1988), Altonji and Shakotko
(1987), Topel (1991), and Dustmann and Meghir (2005).
4For a detailed discussion on the consequences of omitting match effects see Woodcock
(2007).
5See Poletaev and Swaim (2008) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) for enlightening
discussions on the role of occupational specific human capital as a major determinant of
earnings.
3
However, a long job tenure may signal the high unobserved quality of the
match and/or a high ability worker, because more able workers and workers
in good jobs are less likely to separate. To account for endogeneity bias due
to correlation of tenure with the unobserved effects, earlier studies used an IV
approach (see, among others, Neal (1995), Parent (2000), Poletaev and Swaim
(2008), and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)).We contribute to the literature
by addressing this source of wage loss looking directly at changes of job titles
before and after displacement and by using a fixed effects approach that allows
for arbitrary correlation among the regressors and the unobserved effects.
To sensibly incorporate these many wage determinants, our methodology
relies heavily on the estimation of a wage equation with three high-dimensional
fixed effects - worker, firm, and job title - using a nationally representative
matched employer-employee-job title data set - Quadros de Pessoal (QP) -
that allows us, based on the omitted variables bias formula (Gelbach (2016)),
to compute the independent contribution of each unobserved fixed effect to
the monthly wage losses of displaced workers. The universal coverage of the
employed population in the private sector in Portugal combined with these
econometric tools creates the favorable conditions for this exercise.
In sum, the contribution of this paper to the current literature is threefold.
First, we are confident that by incorporating match and job title fixed effects we
are able to provide refined estimates (filtered from worker, firm, job title, and
match heterogeneity) of the corresponding sources of earnings losses. Second,
based on the methodology developed by Gelbach (2016), which appeals to the
omitted variables bias formula, we are able to unambiguously disentangle the
sources of the wage losses into the contribution of firm, job title, and match
fixed effects. Third, relying on a different definition of job title, we are able to
provide further empirical evidence regarding its relative importance as a source
of wage losses. Actually, using a definition of job title that takes into account
the architecture of the Portuguese bargaining system, which shares the same
essential features of most countries in continental Europe (see, for example,
Burda and Mertens (2001) for Germany and Garda (2012) for Spain), we are
confident of the strength of the external validity of our exercise.
Even though Portugal and the U.S. have different institutional labor market
frameworks (Blanchard and Portugal (2001)), our results are in accordance
with earlier studies for the U.S. Based on the JLS methodology, the wages
loss estimates reported here represent, eight years after the separation event,
a penalty of 12 percent on pre-displacement wages.
Furthermore, we conclude that the worker-firm match plays a non-negligble
role as a source of the wage losses of the displaced.The unfavorable allocation
into firms and job titles that are less generously remunerated also plays an
important role. Overall, allocation of workers into poorer matches accounts
for 38 percent of the average wage loss, while job downgrading accounts for 26
percent. The remaining 36 percent is accounted for by the firm fixed effects.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the data and the sample construction. Section 3 presents a brief description of
the Portuguese wage bargaining system and discusses the notion of job title.
The empirical methodology and the results are presented in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 The data
2.1 Quadros de Pessoal data set
In this study we use a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set called
Quadros de Pessoal (QP – “Lists of Personnel”) for the 1986-2013 period. The
data are gathered annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment through
an inquiry that every establishment with even a single wage-earner is obliged
by law to fill in. Reported data cover the firm, the establishment, and each
of its workers. Currently, QP gathers information on more than 300,000 firms
and about 3 million workers. Given the mandatory nature of the survey plus
the fact that these data cover all wage earners in the private sector in Portugal,
problems commonly associated with panel data sets, such as panel attrition,
are considerably reduced.
Data reported on the worker side include gender, age, schooling, and de-
tailed information on monthly earnings - base wages, regular payments (e.g.,
seniority), irregular benefits (profit distributions and premiums), overtime pay-
ments, and hours of work (normal and overtime). The information on earnings
is reported by the employer, which is known to be subject to less measurement
error than worker-provided earnings data.6
As mentioned above, this survey is conducted on a yearly basis, and its
identifying scheme allows for accurate identification of firms and workers, mak-
ing it possible to track them over the years. Each firm entering the database
is assigned a unique identifying number and the Ministry implements several
checks to ensure that a firm that has already reported to the QP dataset is
not assigned a different identification number. Using this identifier it is pos-
sible to pinpoint all firms that have entered and exited economic activity. In
particular, an exit from the database should signal a firm that has ceased its
activity. The firm data include detailed information on industry, region, own-
ership type, and size. The worker’s identification number is based on the social
security number. Finally, this source enables the matching of firms and their
workers, which allows us to control for match characteristics.
6All earnings variables were deflated using the Consumer Price Index (with base-year
2008).
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2.2 Sample construction - displaced workers
Our “treatment” group includes 22 cohorts of workers who lost their jobs be-
tween 1988 and 2011 due to firm closure.7 Firm closures were identified based
on the firm’s identifying number. Thus, a firm is classified as an exiting firm in
year t+ 1 if it is present in the QP files in year t, but absent in t+ 1, t+ 2 and
all of the subsequent years. To ensure that we are in the presence of firms’ true
closures and not mergers or acquisitions, we excluded from the sample those
workers that appeared in the database in the period following displacement
with a year of admission in the new job less than the year of displacement
minus one.8 These exclusions reduced the sample size by around 1.6%.
Within the reference period, some individuals experience successive spells of
firm closure in firms that are necessarily different. For identification purposes,
and to be more precise, we used information from only the first firm closure
within the reference period. Thus, only the first firm closure is used to identify
a displacement and the years before and after are used relative to that year of
displacement.
For comparison purposes the samples used in this study are selected as in
JLS and Couch and Placzek (2010). To be included in the sample a worker must
report positive earnings in the year that immediately precedes the displacement
event and must be continuously employed with the same employer during the
first three years (screening period). This means that workers are selected into
the sample with at least three years of tenure by the time of the reference year.
Furthermore, a worker must report positive earnings at least once thereafter,
and have known information on his/her age. The sample was restricted to
full-time wage earners in the private non-farm sector aged between 16 and 64
years during the final year of the screening period and that were employed in a
firm with at least 20 employees (these restrictions reduced the sample size by
38 percent).
For estimation purposes we define a measure of time relative to the dis-
placement event (reference year is D0). For example, we define D0 in 1997 for
the 1997 displaced group, D0 in 1998 for the 1998 displaced group, and so on.
The data set combines 22 cohorts (1988-2011) of displaced workers over the
1986-2013 period ranging from D−10 up to D10.9
In sum, the sample includes all displaced individuals who are employed
in the year that immediately precedes the displacement, D0, and at least two
periods before the reference year (D−2) and who are present in the QP registers
7For example, the 1997 “treatment” group comprises individuals who were working in 1997
and experienced a displacement event between years 1997 and 1998 (the firm closed down
between November 1997 and September 1998).
8If, for example, a worker’s displacement year is 1997 and (s)he appears in the database
in the post-displacement period with a year of admission in the new job of 1996 or earlier,
(s)he is excluded from the sample.
9It should be noted that worker files are not available for the years 1990 and 2001.
6
Table 1: Sample composition: displaced workers
Year Displaced
D−10 16285
D−9 22593
D−8 26780
D−7 35962
D−6 44730
D−5 52791
D−4 62436
D−3 77034
D−2 92780
D−1 95527
D0 116815
D1 34838
D2 47718
D3 51136
D4 51040
D5 46402
D6 41755
D7 39088
D8 34404
D9 32311
D10 31948
Total 1,054,373
Notes: The sample includes all displaced in-
dividuals who are employed in the year of the
displacement D0 and at least two periods be-
fore displacement (D−2) and who are in reem-
ployment in at least one year before the end of
the sample period.
in at least one year of the post-displacement period. Table 1 reports the number
of worker/year observations for the sample of workers displaced due to firm
closure. According to Table 1, 116,815 workers were displaced due to firm
closure in the 1988-2011 period (1,054,373 worker-year observations).
7
Table 2: Sample composition: non-displaced workers
Year Non-displaced Displaced
1986 583990 13277
1987 617751 16985
1988 611681 19247
1989 637351 22884
1991 699676 28207
1992 716426 31308
1993 708907 33933
1994 714354 34527
1995 766647 41721
1996 751205 43238
1997 800776 48979
1998 800269 52144
1999 813800 56954
2000 826691 57295
2002 812054 47713
2003 816926 49894
2004 864708 51557
2005 911886 55457
2006 938036 54835
2007 970006 53962
2008 997136 52671
2009 963099 48055
2010 1017983 43562
2011 1033436 33453
2012 995861 31269
2013 987023 31246
Total 21,357,678 1,054,373
2.3 Sample construction - non-displaced workers
The group of non-displaced workers (the control group) includes all individuals
who were employed in firms that did not close in the 1986-2013 period. The
group of non-displaced workers was also restricted to full-time wage earners
in the private non-farm sector aged between 16 and 64 years and that were
employed in a firm with at least 20 employees.
In order to guarantee that the worker was employed with the same employer
in the pre-displacement period, we checked the firm’s identifying number as-
signed to the worker over that period. These workers were followed over the
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post-displacement period if they remained with the same employer over that
period.
After excluding those observations with missing values in the explanatory
variables and the extreme values in wages (0.1% top and bottom observations),
we obtained a control group composed of 21,357,678 non-displaced worker/year.
Table 2 reports the number of observations per year in the sample of non-
displaced workers over the 1986-2013 period.
2.4 Sample description
Table 8 in Appendix A presents the descriptive statistics in the reference period
for both groups of workers - displaced and non-displaced. Displaced workers are
slightly younger and have fewer years of education and tenure in comparison
with their non-displaced counterparts. Moreover, the proportion of women is
higher in the group of displaced workers when compared with the group of
non-displaced. As expected, firms that close down are smaller and are mainly
operating in the sectors of manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.
Displaced workers earn significantly lower wages than their non-displaced
counterparts. The average real monthly wage amounts to 1,067 euros for the
displaced, while for the non-displaced it equals 1,258 euros. Furthermore, a
simple descriptive statistics comparison suggests that displaced workers expe-
rienced substantial long-term monthly earnings losses following displacement.
As shown in Figure 1, the average monthly earnings of workers who separated
in 1997 fell sharply in comparison with their non-displaced counterparts.
3 Identification of job titles
In this section we provide a brief description of the architecture of the Por-
tuguese wage bargaining system and a detailed discussion on how job titles
were identified in our approach.
3.1 The Portuguese wage bargaining system
The Portuguese Constitution provides the legal principles of collective bargain-
ing and grants unions the right to negotiate. The effects of the agreements are
formally recognized and considered valid sources of labor law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made be-
tween the conventional regime and the mandatory regime. Conventional bar-
gaining results from direct negotiation between employers’ and workers’ rep-
resentatives. A mandatory regime, on the other hand, does not result from
direct bargaining between these two, but is instead dictated by the Ministry
of Employment. The Ministry can extend an existing collective agreement to
other workers initially not covered by it, or it can create a new one if it is not
viable to extend the application of an existing document. A mandatory regime
9
Figure 1: Monthly earnings of workers separating in year 1997 and
non-displaced workers
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Non-displaced Displaced
Notes: Log monthly earnings. If a worker does not appear in the dataset zero earnings
are assumed.
is applied when workers are not covered by unions, when one of the parties
involved refuses to negotiate, or bargaining is obstructed in any other way.
Overall, coverage of collective agreements in the Portuguese private sector is
above 90 percent.
Beyond the existence of compulsory extension mechanisms, voluntary ex-
tensions are also possible when one economic partner (workers’ representative
or employer) decides to subscribe to an agreement that it had initially not
signed. Therefore, the impact of collective bargaining goes far beyond union
membership and the distinction between union and non-union workers or firms
becomes largely meaningless.
Collective negotiations are conducted at the industry or, occasionally, at the
occupation level. Firm-level negotiation, which for a time was a common prac-
tice in large public enterprises, has lost importance. The law does not establish
mechanisms of coordination between agreements reached in different negotia-
tions; however, preference is given to vertical over horizontal agreements, and
10
the principle of the most favorable condition to the worker generally applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies of
very different size and economic condition, their contents tend to be general,
setting minimum working conditions, in particular the base monthly wage for
each category of worker, overtime pay, and the normal duration of work.10
Moreover, few topics are updated annually, and therefore the content of collec-
tive agreements is often pointed out as being out-of-date and containing little
innovation.
Whatever the wage floor agreed upon for each category of worker at the
collective bargaining table, firms are free to pay higher wages, and they often
deviate from that benchmark, adjusting to firm-specific conditions. Cardoso
and Portugal (2005) call this the “wage cushion”, the difference between the-
contractual part of the wage and the actual wage. They estimate that in 1999
actual wages exceeded the level of bargained wages by 20-50 percent.
3.2 The notion of job title
This paper revisits the earnings losses literature by offering an overall assess-
ment of the sources of those losses with an emphasis on the role of the job
title.
In our framework the notion of job title comes simply from the identifica-
tion of distinct occupational categories within each collective wage agreement.
It is worth noting that the Ministry of Employment collects the QP data in
order to check if employers are complying with the wage floors agreed upon
for each occupational category. In QP each worker in each year is assigned
to the conflation of her/his professional category (at the 5 digits level) and
corresponding collective agreement. Overall, in a given year there are around
30,000 collective agreements/job title combinations to which workers can be
assigned. Even though in Portugal collective negotiations are conducted at
the industry or, to a lesser extent, occupation level, it is possible that similar
workers employed in the same firm-occupation can earn different wages if they
are covered by different collective agreements, e.g., a secretary in the bank-
ing industry agreement as opposed to a secretary in the retail trade collective
agreement.
As pointed out by Martins (2014), “These agreements establish a large
number of working conditions that apply to the signatory parties, including
minimum wages by job type and job tenure but also many other issues such as
working time, fringe benefits, training, health and safety, promotions, contract
types, severance pay, bonuses, grievances, etc.”
Hence, job titles summarize the general and specific skills of the worker,
in particular those that are industry and occupation specific. Given the way
those job titles were identified, they may also reflect the bargaining power
10See Hartog et al. (2002) for the effects of bargaining regimes.
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of the workers’ and the employers’ associations. Because job titles contain
the skill requirements of the position held by the worker, they also retain the
hierarchical standing of the workers. In our framework, a change in the job
title could lead:
(i) to a switch in the professional category code within the same collective
agreement; holding other factors constant, severe losses in the returns to the job
title may represent a job downgrading due to the difficulty of finding a job that
uses existing skills optimally or due to the depreciation of general or specific
human capital during non-employment spells or to a loss of job shopping rents
(Johnson (1978), Addison and Portugal (1987) and Topel and Ward (1992));
(ii) to a switch in the collective agreement, this change may reflect the
loss/gains of rents associated with the bargaining power of unions and em-
ployers’ associations at the bargaining table and industry specific skills (Neal
(1995));11
(iii) to a switch in the hierarchical standing within the same collective
agreement/professional category; this type of change is quite often related to
the loss of tenure in the previous job/firm and should reflect the loss of returns
on specific human capital (Hamermesh (1987)); the nature of this change may
also be related with the loss of rents associated with promotion practices inside
the firm.
4 Empirical results
4.1 JLS statistical specifications
To evaluate the effect of displacement on earnings we start by using the method-
ological framework used by JLS. The first statistical specification assumes that
workers’ earnings at a given time period depend on displacement and on some
controls for fixed and time-varying characteristics of the worker and the econ-
omy:
wit = αi + γt + βXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδk + it (1)
where wit represents the monthly earnings (in logs and real euros) for each indi-
vidual i in year t. Monthly earnings correspond to total regular and non-regular
payroll (base wage, regular payments, non-regular benefits, and overtime pay-
ments) in the reference month. Labor earnings are taken as zero whenever
the individuals are out of work. Dkit are dummy variables where k is equal to
−m,−(m− 1), ..., 0, 1, 2, ..., which represent jointly the event of displacement.
δk represents the effect of displacement on worker’s earnings k years prior to,
and following, its occurrence. The worker fixed effect, αi, captures the impact
11Recall that the same professional category could be covered by a different collective
bargaining mechanism, as mentioned above.
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of permanent differences among worker’s observed and unobserved character-
istics, and γt are calendar year fixed effects included to capture the general
aggregate time pattern of earnings in the economy. Finally, the vector Xit con-
trols for age and age squared. it is an error term, assumed to be uncorrelated
with the covariates. Our identification strategy follows closely the one explored
by JLS. In a nutshell, we compare the earnings changes of displaced workers
over a long-term period with the earnings changes that would have occurred if
the displaced had not lost their jobs. Since this latter outcome variable is not
observable, a comparison group of non-displaced workers is used. We assume
that after controlling for the relevant covariates, the displaced workers would
have behaved as the non-displaced in the absence of the displacement event.
4.2 Estimations based on the JLS model
The results from the estimation of the JLS model used in equation (1) are
summarized in Figure 2. In accordance with the fixed-effects specification, the
monthly earnings losses amounted to 91 percent of average pre-displacement
wages 1 year after the shutdown of the firm, and decreased to 50 percent, 10
years after displacement.
The size of the loss is driven largely by the joblessness experience of the
displaced workers, where, in accordance with JLS, labor earnings are taken
as zero whenever the individuals are out of work. The upswing of earnings
after the first year of displacement is generated mostly by the reemployment
of workers.12 Note that the estimates produced by the fixed effects and the
random trend models are fairly identical, as in Couch and Placzek (2010) - see
Table 10 in Appendix B. In contrast with JLS, but in line with Couch and
Placzek (2010), we fail to observe a severe earnings dip prior to displacement.
In our individual-trend specification there is no indication that earnings had
fallen before the firm closure. For the fixed-effects specification, however, there
is some mild evidence that earnings fell modestly.
When we restrict our analysis to the profile of monthly wages, thereby
excluding the joblessness events before and after displacement, we find that
wages started declining more deeply two years before the shutdown of the firm
and continued to decline for up to eight years after firm closure, remaining 12
percent below the average pre-displacement wages of the displaced (see Figure
3). At least three mechanisms may be at work. First, it may be that work-
ers who found relatively higher wage offers returned earlier to employment.
Second, longer joblessness duration may have impaired the human capital of
displaced workers. And third, it may take some time for unemployed individu-
als to realize that their expectation about the relevant wage offer distribution
12Conditional on being displaced and returning, 14 percent of the individuals return in the
first year, 16 percent return after 2 years, 14 percent return after 3 years, 13 percent return
after 4 years, 10 percent return after 5 years, 9 percent return after 6 years, 8 percent return
after 7 years, 8 percent return after 8 years, and 8 percent return after 9 years.
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Figure 2: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers
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Notes: Log monthly earnings losses including transitions to zeros. On the horizontal
axis the relative time to firm closure is plotted in years. In the regressions we control
for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. See left part of Table 9 in
Appendix B for the detailed results of the regressions.
is unrealistic, in particular in a labor market in which the potential duration of
unemployment benefits is very generous (reaching up to 57 months of potential
duration).13
13The same analysis was repeated for collective dismissals - an individual is classified as
displaced due to a collective dismissal if the firm’s employment dropped between year t and
year t + 1, 30 percent or more below its level at year t (firms with fewer than 20 employees
were also removed from the sample). We find broadly similar results. One year after the
separation, the monthly earnings losses amounted to 92 percent of average pre-displacement
wages. Conditional on returning, 13 percent of the individuals return in the first year, 15
percent return after 2 years, 13 percent return after 3 years, 12 percent return after 4 years,
11 percent return after 5 years, 9 percent return after 6 years, 9 percent return after 7 years,
9 percent return after 8 years, and 9 percent return after 9 years. Here, not even a small fall
in earnings prior to separation is observed. The overall shape of the evolution of wage rates
again mimics those observed for firm closures, even if the fall is not as large. Wage rates
decline 7 percent for the fixed-effects model, after displacement comparing with the period
before displacement.
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Figure 3: Monthly wage loss of displaced workers
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Notes: Log monthly wage losses excluding transitions to zeros. The year of firm
closure is taken as the reference year (δk is normalized to zero). On the horizontal
axis the relative time to firm closure is plotted in years. In the regressions we control
for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. See right part of Table 9 in
Appendix B for the detailed results of the regressions.
4.3 Estimations based on the three-way high-dimensional FE
model
4.3.1 The empirical distribution of wages: pre-displacement
To better understand the nature of the wage rate changes that affected dis-
placed workers in comparison to non-displaced workers, we turn to the estima-
tion of the three-way high-dimensional fixed effects regression model as given
in the following equation:14
14Appendix C describes the procedure developed by Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) that
allows estimation of a three-way high-dimensional fixed effects model in order to obtain the
estimates of worker, firm, and job title fixed effects.
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wijft = αi + λj + θf + γ
full
t + β
fullXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδ
full
k + 
full
ijft (2)
which allows computation of the worker, firm, and job title fixed effects. The
estimation is based on all the wage earners observed between 1986 and 2013,
corresponding to 22,412,051 observations. The interpretation of the parameters
of this model is straightforward and the decomposition exercise enabled by it,
that is, the role of worker, firm, and job title heterogeneity, is discussed at
length by Torres et al. (2013).
We start by graphing the empirical wage distributions of workers displaced
due to firm closures and their non-displaced counterparts in Figure 4 (a). It
is clear that the wages of displaced workers are lower (18 percent, on average)
and less dispersed when compared with those of the non-displaced.The overall
shape of the wage distribution can be better understood by looking at the
distributions of the worker, firm, and job title fixed effects.
Figure 4 (b) depicts the empirical distribution of permanent worker hetero-
geneity, both observed (such as gender or schooling) and unobserved. A high
worker fixed effect (high-wage worker) is an individual with total compensation
higher than expected on the basis of observable time-varying regressors, for a
given firm and job title. A distinction is made between continuing matches
and those destroyed by firm closures. The graph is based on the 3,863,071 es-
timates of worker fixed effects. Not surprisingly, the shape of the distributions
closely resembles the distributional shape of log wages. The linear correlation
between log wages and worker fixed effects is 0.80. From the comparison be-
tween displaced and non-displaced workers it is clear that those workers who
exited their firms have permanent (observed and unobserved) characteristics
that are associated with substantially lower wages.
Less well studied is the heterogeneity of wage policies across firms. In
Figure 4 (c) we present the empirical distribution of the 76,559 firm fixed
effects. A high firm fixed effect (high-wage policy from the firm) is a firm
with total compensation higher than expected on the basis of observable time-
varying regressors, once we take into account the (permanent) heterogeneity of
workers and job titles. The role of firm heterogeneity on wage formation is quite
important. The linear correlation coefficient between log wages and firm fixed
effects is no less than 0.60. Not surprisingly, the comparison between the two
distributions shows that displaced workers earned much lower wages in large
part because the firms from which they separated exhibited a less generous
wage policy.
The heterogeneity of job title fixed effects is likely to be generated by vari-
ations across occupations and skills and by differences across collective wage
agreements. As discussed above, the notion of job title comes simply from the
identification of distinct occupational categories within each collective wage
agreement. Throughout the years of the survey we could estimate 122,647 job
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Figure 4: The empirical distribution of wages pre-displacement (ref-
erence year D0)
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Notes: This figure plots the empirical distributions of different variables before displacement
of workers displaced due to firm closures and their non-displaced counterparts (reference year
D0).
title fixed effects. A high job title fixed effect (job title premium) is a job title
with total compensation higher than expected on the basis of observable time-
varying regressors after controlling for the heterogeneity of workers and firms.
Job title heterogeneity has a non-trivial impact on the determination of wages.
The linear correlation between job title fixed effects and wages is a respectable
0.49. From panel (d) in Figure 4 it is clear that prior to firm closure displaced
workers filled positions that were paid below those of the non-displaced.
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4.3.2 The empirical distribution of wages of the displaced: pre- and
post-displacement
Figure 5: The empirical distribution of wages of displaced workers:
pre- and post-displacement
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Notes: Displaced workers’ density distributions before displacement and after displacement.
Monthly wage in panel (a) is detrended.
In Figure 5 we compare the distribution of wages (and its components)
of displaced workers based on average values before and after displacement.
Panel (a) of the figure shows that the distribution of wages was shifted to the
left, evincing some wage losses associated with firm closures. Panel (b) has
the worker fixed effect distribution. Except for the self-selection generated by
different timing of reemployment, the two distributions should coincide exactly,
which for the most part they do, suggesting that the time profile of reemploy-
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ment is not a serious concern, at least in the worker heterogeneity dimension.
Panels (c) and (d) both reveal that workers moved, on average, to lower paying
firms and job titles, especially, in the right tail of the two distributions. Ac-
tually, 55 percent of displaced workers move to more poorly paying firms. 37
percent move to job titles that are better paid, 10 percent do not change job
titles, and 53 percent move to job titles that are more poorly paid than their
pre-displacement job title.15
4.3.3 The decomposition of the wage loss
It is possible to calculate the independent contribution of each fixed effect to the
monthly wage losses of displaced workers. For this purpose we use the method-
ology developed in Gelbach (2016), which appeals to the omitted variables bias
formula to compute a detailed decomposition. This procedure allows us to un-
ambiguously disentangle the contribution of each excluded variable (each fixed
effect) to the change in the coefficient estimate of the variables under scrutiny.
To illustrate Gelbach’s decomposition, we start by defining the base model
with worker fixed effects:
wit = α
base
i + γ
base
t + β
baseXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδ
base
k + 
base
it (3)
where δbasek are the relevant wage loss coefficients. By excluding the firm and
job title fixed effects, this equation suffers from omitted variables bias. Then,
it is necessary to specify the full model with the two fixed effects as in equation
(2).
The base-full difference equals the sample analog of the omitted variables
bias formula. Gelbach’s algorithm allows us to decompose the difference δbasek −
δfullk into the separate effect deriving from each excluded variable (each fixed
effect). The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1. Use OLS to estimate the vector of coefficients in equation (3). Extract
δbasek ;
Step 2. Use OLS to estimate the vector of coefficients in equation (2). Extract
δfullk ;
Step 3. Use a set of two auxiliary regressions for λˆj and θˆf acting now as the
dependent variables and where all the other variables in equation (2) are
used as explanatory variables, that is on Xit and D
k
it;
15Displaced workers are more likely to be confronted by job title downgrades than job title
upgrades. We had a close look to the more frequent job title moves among displaced workers.
However, given the unusually high level of disaggregation, it is very hard to establish clear
patterns of job title movements. Some illustrative changes can, nevertheless reveal the job
title dynamics. For example, we observe a significant number of truck drivers becoming car
drivers, earlier dress makers working as janitors, and shoemakers converting to cloth-workers.
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Step 4. Extract the coefficients on Dkit and denote them as τˆ
λ
k and τˆ
θ
k , respectively,
for each of the fixed effects.
Step 5. Verify that the equality δbasek −δfullk = τˆλk + τˆ θk holds, for each time period
k.
In summary, the decomposition proposed by Gelbach is a computationally
simple and econometrically meaningful procedure that takes advantage, in a
surprisingly ingenious way, of the conventional OLS omitted variable bias for-
mula. If the base specification is a parsimonious useful benchmark, and in our
case it is simply a conditional gross measure of the displacement wage rate
losses, the decomposition is also economically meaningful, providing an unam-
biguous measure of the contribution of each omitted variable to the change in
the original coefficients of the displacement dummies. For example, the fact
that the inclusion of firm fixed effects contributes to decreasing the wage loss
of displaced workers, simply accounts for the evidence that displaced workers
tend to sort themselves into firms that pay, on average, lower wages. When
we compare the impact of firm fixed effects before and after displacement, we
are simply isolating the dominant influence of movements from higher paying
firms into lower paying firms. A similar interpretation applies to the role of
job title fixed effects.
The results of the Gelbach decomposition are reported in Table 3. The
first two columns of the table give the coefficient estimates for the benchmark
OLS regression with worker fixed effects (base model) and for a regression
that includes, in addition, the three fixed effects (full model). Recall that in
the fixed effects model, the estimates of the coefficients of the displacement
dummies do not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of wage losses
of displaced workers relative to non-displaced workers, since the coefficients
represent within-individual wage changes over time.
Hence, according to the base model estimates and turning our attention
to average differences in the periods before and after displacement (last line),
we conclude that post-displacement wages are 10 log points lower than pre-
displacement wages, i.e., 9.5 percent less than average pre-displacement wages.
Once we account for firm and job title fixed effects, the remaining unexplained
difference in wages falls to 2.6 log points. This means that the inclusion of
the fixed effects accounts for 7.4 log points of the difference between the wages
before and after displacement, where 4.2 log points are accounted for by the
firm fixed effect, and 3.2 log points are accounted for by the job title fixed
effect.
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Table 3: Decomposition of the wage loss - firm and job title
Period Base Full
relative Firm Job title
to displacement δbasek − δfullk fixed effect fixed effect
D−10 0.105 0.016 0.088 0.043 0.045
D−9 0.102 0.012 0.089 0.045 0.044
D−8 0.099 0.014 0.084 0.043 0.041
D−7 0.093 0.010 0.083 0.045 0.038
D−6 0.119 0.033 0.086 0.046 0.040
D−5 0.085 0.001 0.084 0.046 0.038
D−4 0.073 -0.008 0.082 0.045 0.037
D−3 0.073 -0.008 0.081 0.044 0.037
D−2 0.071 -0.006 0.077 0.042 0.035
D−1 0.064 -0.012 0.076 0.042 0.034
D0 0.056 -0.020 0.076 0.043 0.034
D1 0.037 -0.025 0.062 0.035 0.027
D2 0.022 -0.022 0.044 0.024 0.020
D3 0.005 -0.024 0.029 0.015 0.015
D4 -0.009 -0.026 0.017 0.006 0.010
D5 -0.019 -0.025 0.007 0.001 0.006
D6 -0.024 -0.022 -0.002 -0.005 0.003
D7 -0.033 -0.022 -0.011 -0.010 -0.001
D8 -0.042 -0.023 -0.019 -0.014 -0.005
D9 -0.039 -0.019 -0.020 -0.011 -0.009
D10 -0.042 -0.018 -0.023 -0.017 -0.007
µPre−displacement 0.086 0.003 0.082 0.044 0.038
µPost−displacement -0.014 -0.023 0.008 0.002 0.006
∆ -0.100 -0.026 -0.074 -0.042 -0.032
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the two fixed ef-
fects of the wage loss of displaced workers (log monthly wage). In the re-
gressions we control for age, age squared, and calendar year fixed effects.
All regressions are computed with worker fixed effects. In each column
µPre−displacement is the computed average between the first eleven lines (D−10
to D0). µPost−displacement is the computed average between the next ten lines
(D1 to D10). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the previous
two lines.
In this setup, the most important factor driving the wage penalty of these
displaced workers is the fact that they are reemployed in firms that have less
generous wage policies, accounting for 57 percent of the total explained average
wage loss. This result seems also to indicate that low-paying firms are the most
21
likely port of re-entry into employment for displaced workers. The fact that
these workers are reemployed in job categories (and/or collective agreements)
that are less generously remunerated also plays an important role.16 The un-
favorable allocation into job titles accounts for roughly 43 percent of the total
average wage loss. 17
4.4 Assessing the role of worker-firm match quality
As discussed above, in this framework it is important to distinguish a good
worker in a good firm from a good worker-firm match. To allow for the pos-
sibility that there are some observed and unobserved permanent worker-firm
match heterogeneities that constitute important determinants of wages, follow-
ing Woodcock (2008), we incorporate an additional term in the regression (ψif ),
which now also incorporates the interaction between worker and firm. This ex-
tension is applied to the monthly wage discarding observations in which labor
earnings are zero. The full baseline specification is given by Equation (4a).
wijft = αi + λj + θf + ψif + γt + βXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδk + it (4a)
However, this model is overparameterized, making it impossible to disen-
tangle the four effects. In this model, the quality of the worker-firm match
is indistinguishable from a good employee working in a good firm. In other
words, without any restriction on the parameters, ψif absorbs the effect of αi
and θf , meaning that a model with a single worker-firm match term (ωif ) will
capture the three effects and provide the same fit as equation (4a).
wijft = ωif + λj + γt + βXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδk + it (5)
Nevertheless, we are interested in the relationship between ψif and δk after
controlling for all other explanatory variables in equation (4a). Fortunately,
Figueiredo et al. (2014) show that the impact of match quality (ψif ) can be
extracted from a regression of ωif on firm and worker fixed effects plus the
other regressors in the base specification. Alternatively, the same estimate can
be obtained directly by comparing the estimated coefficients of equations (2)
and (5).
16The wage change (in particular that associated with the job title and the firm fixed effect)
can be generated by rents or compensating wage differentials, as discussed above. In the first
case a wage drop after displacement can be interpreted as a welfare loss to the worker, in the
second case there may be no welfare loss.
17When we repeat the same analysis using before and after instead of the yearly dummies,
respectively D−10 −D0 and D1 to D10, we find broadly comparable results. Workers in our
sample faced a wage penalty of 9 log points. The two fixed effects account for 7 log points
of the total loss, which can be disentangled as 4 log points due to sorting into lower paying
firms, and 3 log points due to sorting into lower paying job titles.
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Table 4: Decomposition of the wage loss - firm, worker-firm match
and job title
Period Base Full
relative Firm Match Job title
to displacement δbasek − δfullk fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
D−10 0.105 -0.011 0.116 0.043 0.031 0.042
D−9 0.102 -0.016 0.118 0.045 0.031 0.042
D−8 0.099 -0.015 0.114 0.043 0.032 0.039
D−7 0.093 -0.019 0.113 0.045 0.032 0.035
D−6 0.119 0.004 0.115 0.046 0.032 0.037
D−5 0.085 -0.029 0.114 0.046 0.033 0.036
D−4 0.073 -0.038 0.111 0.045 0.032 0.034
D−3 0.073 -0.038 0.111 0.044 0.033 0.033
D−2 0.071 -0.036 0.107 0.042 0.033 0.032
D−1 0.064 -0.041 0.105 0.042 0.032 0.031
D0 0.056 -0.049 0.105 0.043 0.032 0.030
D1 0.037 -0.020 0.057 0.035 -0.002 0.024
D2 0.022 -0.012 0.034 0.024 -0.007 0.017
D3 0.005 -0.012 0.017 0.015 -0.011 0.013
D4 -0.009 -0.012 0.003 0.006 -0.012 0.008
D5 -0.019 -0.010 -0.009 0.001 -0.014 0.004
D6 -0.024 -0.006 -0.018 -0.005 -0.015 0.002
D7 -0.033 -0.005 -0.028 -0.010 -0.016 -0.001
D8 -0.042 -0.005 -0.037 -0.014 -0.018 -0.005
D9 -0.039 -0.002 -0.037 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008
D10 -0.042 -0.004 -0.038 -0.017 -0.015 -0.006
µPre−displacement 0.086 -0.026 0.112 0.044 0.032 0.035
µPost−displacement -0.014 -0.009 -0.006 0.002 -0.013 0.005
∆ -0.100 0.017 -0.117 -0.042 -0.045 -0.030
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the two fixed effects of the
wage loss of displaced workers. In the regressions we control for age, age squared,
and calendar year fixed effects. All regressions are computed with worker fixed
effects. In each column µPre−displacement is the computed average between the first
eleven lines (D−10 to D0). µPost−displacement is the computed average between the
next ten lines (D1 to D10). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the
previous two lines.
We next introduce a worker-firm specific fixed effect that accounts for match
heterogeneity. This match effect absorbs the worker and the firm individual
fixed effects. We can conclude that the worker-firm match quality is responsible
for a sizable 4.5 log points of the wage loss, the firms fixed effects accounts for
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4.2 log points and the job title fixed effect for the remaining 3.0 log points of
the total explained wage loss.
In sum, controlling for the worker-firm match, we find that the latter ac-
counts for 38 percent of the total wage loss, allocation into unfavaroble job ti-
tles accounts for 26 percent, and the remaining 36 percent could be attributed
to firm fixed effects. Thus, failure to account for match effects largely over-
estimates the role of the reallocation of workers into firms and job titles in
explaining the wage losses of the displaced.18
4.5 Assessing the role of the bargained wage
In this section we split the wage rate into two components, the bargained wage
and the wage cushion, and proceed, as before, with the Gelbach decomposi-
tion exercise. The bargained wage corresponds to the wage floor negotiated
(typically at the industry level) between the trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations for each job title. Firms often pay wages above this floor (as discussed
above), leading to a gap between the actual wage paid and the bargained wage,
which we call the wage cushion. Because we can not directly observe the bar-
gained wage we compute for each job title (in any given year) the modal base
wage and used it as a proxy for the collectively agreed wage, a methodology
identical to the one pursued by Cardoso and Portugal (2005).
Table 5 shows the results of the exercise for the bargained wage. A use-
ful way to look at the decompositions is to think of an artificial situation in
which all workers simply collect the bargained wage corresponding to their job
titles. In this case, the wage loss of the displaced workers would be generated
by changes in the (imputed) remuneration of job titles, before and after dis-
placement. The results indicate that job downgrading plays a very important
role, implying a loss of 7 percent. In other words, if workers receive exactly
the bargained wage, the wage loss of displaced workers would have been, on
average, 7 percent. By construction, in this decomposition there is no role
for the allocation of displaced workers among firms, and indeed, the estimated
impact of the wage policy of the firms is negligible.
The wage policy of the firms is much more important in the determination
of the wage cushion. Table 6 shows that displaced workers are allocated to
relatively less-generous firms in terms of the wage cushion, implying a wage
loss of around 3.8 percent. Displaced workers are allocated to relatively bet-
ter paying job titles in terms of the wage cushion, partially offsetting (by 3.7
percent) the loss in terms of the bargained wage. In this set-up, a loss of 2.8
18When we repeat the same analysis for collective dismissals, we find broadly comparable
results. Workers in our sample affected by collective dismissals faced a somewhat lower wage
penalty (8 log points) than those that suffered from a firm closure (10 log points) - see
Appendix D. The allocation into firms with different wage policies is the most influential
factor, accounting for 45 percent of the total average loss. Sorting into job titles explains 20
percent of the loss. Worker-firm match explains 35 percent of the total average loss.
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percent remains unexplained.
Overall, the decompositions for the bargained wage and the wage cushion
are coherent with the decomposition of the total wage provided in Table 3.
The unexplained sources of wage losses and those related with firm allocation
are rooted solely in the determination of the wage cushion. The wage losses
associated with the allocation among job titles, however, are negatively affected
by the bargained wage and positively affected by the wage cushion.
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Table 5: Decomposition of the bargained wage
Period Base Full
relative Firm Job title
to displacement δbasek − δfullk fixed effect fixed effect
D−10 0.070 -0.003 0.073 0.004 0.068
D−9 0.072 -0.003 0.076 0.005 0.071
D−8 0.067 -0.006 0.073 0.005 0.067
D−7 0.062 -0.010 0.071 0.006 0.065
D−6 0.066 -0.010 0.075 0.006 0.069
D−5 0.069 -0.008 0.077 0.007 0.070
D−4 0.068 -0.009 0.077 0.008 0.069
D−3 0.068 -0.009 0.077 0.008 0.069
D−2 0.062 -0.011 0.073 0.008 0.065
D−1 0.060 -0.014 0.074 0.007 0.067
D0 0.055 -0.015 0.070 0.008 0.062
D1 0.035 -0.010 0.045 0.006 0.039
D2 0.014 -0.010 0.024 0.004 0.020
D3 0.002 -0.008 0.010 0.004 0.006
D4 -0.001 -0.008 0.007 0.003 0.004
D5 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001
D6 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.004
D7 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 -0.010
D8 -0.027 -0.005 -0.022 0.002 -0.024
D9 -0.024 -0.003 -0.022 0.004 -0.025
D10 -0.028 -0.003 -0.025 0.003 -0.028
µPre−displacement 0.065 -0.009 0.074 0.007 0.068
µPost−displacement -0.005 -0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.002
∆ -0.071 0.002 -0.073 -0.003 -0.070
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the two fixed effects
of the wage loss of displaced workers. In the regressions we control for age, age
squared, and calendar year fixed effects. All regressions are computed with
worker fixed effects. In each column µPre−displacement is the computed average
between the first eleven lines (D−10 to D0). µPost−displacement is the computed
average between the next six lines (D1 to D10). In the line ∆ we compute the
difference between the previous two lines.
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Table 6: Decomposition of the wage cushion
Period Base Full
relative Firm Job title
to displacement δbasek − δfullk fixed effect fixed effect
D−10 0.034 0.019 0.015 0.039 -0.024
D−9 0.028 0.015 0.013 0.040 -0.026
D−8 0.031 0.019 0.012 0.038 -0.026
D−7 0.031 0.019 0.012 0.040 -0.027
D−6 0.052 0.042 0.010 0.039 -0.029
D−5 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.039 -0.032
D−4 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.037 -0.032
D−3 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.036 -0.032
D−2 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.034 -0.030
D−1 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.034 -0.033
D0 0.001 -0.006 0.006 0.035 -0.029
D1 0.001 -0.015 0.016 0.028 -0.012
D2 0.006 -0.013 0.019 0.020 -0.001
D3 0.003 -0.016 0.019 0.011 0.008
D4 -0.008 -0.017 0.009 0.003 0.006
D5 -0.016 -0.020 0.003 -0.002 0.005
D6 -0.017 -0.016 -0.001 -0.008 0.006
D7 -0.020 -0.017 -0.002 -0.012 0.010
D8 -0.015 -0.018 0.003 -0.016 0.018
D9 -0.015 -0.016 0.002 -0.013 0.015
D10 -0.014 -0.016 0.002 -0.019 0.020
µPre−displacement 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.037 -0.029
µPost−displacement -0.010 -0.016 0.007 -0.001 0.008
∆ -0.029 -0.028 -0.001 -0.038 0.037
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the two fixed effects
of the wage loss of displaced workers. In the regressions we control for age, age
squared, and calendar year fixed effects. All regressions are computed with
worker fixed effects. In each column µPre−displacement is the computed average
between the first eleven lines (D−10 to D0). µPost−displacement is the computed
average between the next six lines (D1 to D10). In the line ∆ we compute the
difference between the previous two lines.
4.6 Assessing the role of permanent observed heterogeneity
In a fixed effects approach, worker, firm, and job title fixed effects may include
two components - unobserved and observed time-invariant characteristics. Re-
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Table 7: Assessing the role of permanent observed heterogeneity
∆ Firm ∆ Job title
fixed effect fixed effect
Change industry 2 digits -0.029*** Change occupation (5 digits) -0.003***
(0.004) (0.001)
Change firm size (log) 0.040*** Change collective agreement 0.008***
(0.002) (0.001)
Change single to multi-plant 0.008 Tenure (previous job) -0.026***
(0.006) (0.001)
Change public to private capital -0.024*** Tenure squared 0.005***
(0.007) (0.000)
Change domestic to foreign capital 0.035***
(0.004)
Change region -0.001
(0.004)
Constant -0.047** 0.018***
(0.022) (0.004)
Observations 111,779 111,779
R-squared 0.123 0.046
Notes: In the regressions we control for calendar year fixed effects. All the explanatory variables
except tenure are defined by comparing job and firm characteristics of the displaced in the last
record before (D0) and after displacement. Tenure in the previous job is measured in D0. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
garding the latter, it seems natural to ask how observed components are related
to changes in the firm and job title fixed effects after displacement. For that
purpose we ran two separate OLS regressions using the sample of displaced
workers that were re-employed during the period analyzed, i.e., 111,779 dis-
placed workers after excluding those observations with missing values in the
explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 7.
In the first regression (see left part of Table 7) the dependent variable is
defined as the change in the firm fixed effect in the period after displacement
relative to the period before displacement. Firm observed characteristics in-
clude industry, size (measured by the number of employees and the number of
establishments), ownership type (public or private/foreign or domestic), and
location.19
In the second regression (see right part of Table 7) the dependent variable
is defined as the change in the job title fixed effect after displacement. Job title
observed characteristics include tenure, occupation, and collective agreement.
The estimates show that a change in industry, firm size, and ownership type
play a non-trivial role in driving the change in the firm fixed effect. Further-
19See Abowd et al. (1999) for a discussion of the relationship between pure firm effects and
pure industry and firm-size effects.
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more, the three most important observed characteristics of the job - occupa-
tion, collective agreement, and tenure - are all statistically significant at the
conventional levels. A change in the 5 digits occupation and the loss of tenure
in the previous job are related to sorting into a low-paying job title, while a
change in the collective agreement is related to sorting into a high-paying job.
These results are not unexpected and reinforce the role of job downgrading in
explaining the subsequent wage losses due to displacement.
Finally, the results also show that a large component of the change in the
fixed effects after displacement should be attributed to unobserved firm and
job title characteristics.
5 Concluding remarks
Wage losses of displaced workers can be related to the firm, job title, and
the worker-firm match that existed before and after displacement. In this
paper we first explored the sources of those losses, estimating a three-way
high-dimensional fixed effects regression model, which enabled us to obtain
worker, firm, and job title fixed effects. To decompose the wage losses into the
contribution of each fixed effect, we implemented the conditional decomposition
method suggested by Gelbach (2016).
Based on the JLS methodology, we found that post-displacement wages
are, on average, 9.5 percent lower than pre-displacement wages. Sorting into
matches plays a very sizable role in explaining these losses, accounting for
around 39 percent of the total average wage loss for workers displaced through
firm closures. The allocation into lower-paid job titles also plays a significant
role, accounting for around 26 percent of the total average wage loss. Firm
fixed effects account for the remaining 35 percent. Furthermore, based on the
way those job titles were identified - from a combination of occupation and
collective agreement - we examined how observed components of the job title
are related to those losses. The results seem to show that job downgrading
after displacement is driven mainly by human capital depreciation, which can
be traced through the job title fixed effects, in terms of losses of job specific
training and occupation specific human capital. Sizable industry specific losses
of human capital can also be spotted along the distributional changes of firm
fixed effects.
There are some potentially important policy prescriptions that may be de-
rived from the evidence reported in this study. Severe losses in the returns to
the job title may represent a job downgrading due to depreciation of general
and specific human capital or to the difficulty of finding a new job requiring
skills similar to those acquired in the pre-displacement job. Here, retraining
programs may be of some help.
Losses related with the firm/worker-firm match fixed effect may mean that
a worker is moving from a high paying firm/high-quality match to a low-paying
29
fim/low-quality match. Actually, with the occurrence of a displacement event,
successful job searchers may lose their “job shopping” investment (Johnson
(1978)). If this phenomenon is pervasive, job search assistance programs and
mandatory pre-notification of impending redundancy may be justified.
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6 Appendix
Appendix A
Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Non-displaced Displaced
Total monthly wage (2013 euros) 1258 1067
Minimum monthly wage (2013 euros) 485 485
Age (in years) 38 37
Tenure (in years) 10 6
Female (%) 40 47
Education (%):
Less than basic school 3 2
Basic school 29 32
Preparatory 18 25
Lower Secondary 18 17
Upper Secondary 19 16
College 13 8
Firm size (no. co-workers) 1131 511
Industry (%):
Manufacturing 40 58
Construction 8 8
Wholesale and retail trade 19 17
Transports 8 4
Financial services 14 14
Education/health 11 5
No. observations 21,357,678 1,054,373
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (mean) for the sample. The units are explained in
parentheses.
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Appendix B
Table 9: Detailed results from Figures 2 and 3 - FE model without
trends
Monthly earnings loss Monthly wage loss
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−10 -0.031 0.004 -7.030 0.000 -0.039 -0.022 0.105 0.002 47.920 0.000 0.100 0.109
D−9 0.009 0.004 2.160 0.031 0.001 0.017 0.102 0.002 50.790 0.000 0.098 0.106
D−8 0.017 0.004 4.300 0.000 0.009 0.025 0.099 0.002 51.170 0.000 0.095 0.103
D−7 0.011 0.004 3.010 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.093 0.002 52.380 0.000 0.090 0.097
D−6 0.044 0.004 12.420 0.000 0.037 0.051 0.119 0.002 65.050 0.000 0.115 0.122
D−5 0.016 0.003 4.870 0.000 0.010 0.023 0.085 0.002 52.290 0.000 0.082 0.088
D−4 -0.015 0.003 -4.710 0.000 -0.021 -0.009 0.073 0.002 46.190 0.000 0.070 0.076
D−3 -0.016 0.003 -5.250 0.000 -0.022 -0.010 0.073 0.002 46.400 0.000 0.070 0.076
D−2 -0.032 0.003 -10.810 0.000 -0.038 -0.026 0.071 0.002 46.260 0.000 0.068 0.074
D−1 -0.042 0.003 -14.250 0.000 -0.048 -0.036 0.064 0.002 41.630 0.000 0.061 0.067
D0 -0.034 0.003 -12.530 0.000 -0.039 -0.029 0.056 0.002 37.140 0.000 0.053 0.059
D1 -2.424 0.008 -286.350 0.000 -2.440 -2.407 0.037 0.002 19.240 0.000 0.033 0.040
D2 -2.018 0.008 -254.590 0.000 -2.034 -2.003 0.022 0.002 12.100 0.000 0.018 0.025
D3 -1.710 0.008 -217.310 0.000 -1.725 -1.695 0.005 0.002 2.870 0.004 0.002 0.008
D4 -1.486 0.008 -188.430 0.000 -1.502 -1.471 -0.009 0.002 -5.300 0.000 -0.012 -0.006
D5 -1.390 0.008 -170.580 0.000 -1.405 -1.374 -0.019 0.002 -11.060 0.000 -0.022 -0.015
D6 -1.298 0.009 -152.340 0.000 -1.315 -1.281 -0.024 0.002 -14.100 0.000 -0.028 -0.021
D7 -1.210 0.009 -137.840 0.000 -1.228 -1.193 -0.033 0.002 -19.470 0.000 -0.036 -0.029
D8 -1.107 0.009 -119.360 0.000 -1.125 -1.089 -0.042 0.002 -24.320 0.000 -0.045 -0.038
D9 -0.992 0.010 -103.910 0.000 -1.011 -0.974 -0.039 0.002 -23.010 0.000 -0.042 -0.036
D10 -0.756 0.009 -84.200 0.000 -0.774 -0.738 -0.042 0.002 -27.040 0.000 -0.045 -0.039
Notes: Log monthly earnings (wage) loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including (excluding) transitions
to zeros. In the regressions we control for age, age squared, and calendar year fixed effects.
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Table 10: Detailed results from Figure 2: fixed-effects model and
random trends model (without and with trends)
FE model Random trends model
Without trends With trends
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−10 -0.031 0.004 -7.030 0.000 -0.039 -0.022 -0.001 0.001 -0.800 0.425 -0.004 0.002
D−9 0.009 0.004 2.160 0.031 0.001 0.017 -0.003 0.001 -2.350 0.019 -0.005 0.000
D−8 0.017 0.004 4.300 0.000 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.001 2.290 0.022 0.000 0.005
D−7 0.011 0.004 3.010 0.003 0.004 0.018 -0.005 0.001 -5.070 0.000 -0.007 -0.003
D−6 0.044 0.004 12.420 0.000 0.037 0.051 0.026 0.001 26.730 0.000 0.024 0.027
D−5 0.016 0.003 4.870 0.000 0.010 0.023 -0.001 0.001 -1.610 0.108 -0.003 0.000
D−4 -0.015 0.003 -4.710 0.000 -0.021 -0.009 -0.003 0.001 -5.210 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
D−3 -0.016 0.003 -5.250 0.000 -0.022 -0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.430 0.664 -0.001 0.001
D−2 -0.032 0.003 -10.810 0.000 -0.038 -0.026 0.005 0.000 9.530 0.000 0.004 0.006
D−1 -0.042 0.003 -14.250 0.000 -0.048 -0.036 0.002 0.001 3.820 0.000 0.001 0.003
D0 -0.034 0.003 -12.530 0.000 -0.039 -0.029 -0.003 0.000 -6.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
D1 -2.424 0.008 -286.350 0.000 -2.440 -2.407 -2.361 0.008 -283.390 0.000 -2.377 -2.345
D2 -2.018 0.008 -254.590 0.000 -2.034 -2.003 -2.006 0.008 -260.290 0.000 -2.021 -1.991
D3 -1.710 0.008 -217.310 0.000 -1.725 -1.695 -1.720 0.008 -224.360 0.000 -1.735 -1.705
D4 -1.486 0.008 -188.430 0.000 -1.502 -1.471 -1.513 0.008 -195.510 0.000 -1.528 -1.498
D5 -1.390 0.008 -170.580 0.000 -1.405 -1.374 -1.447 0.008 -177.670 0.000 -1.463 -1.431
D6 -1.298 0.009 -152.340 0.000 -1.315 -1.281 -1.389 0.009 -161.440 0.000 -1.406 -1.372
D7 -1.210 0.009 -137.840 0.000 -1.228 -1.193 -1.319 0.009 -148.290 0.000 -1.336 -1.301
D8 -1.107 0.009 -119.360 0.000 -1.125 -1.089 -1.228 0.009 -129.920 0.000 -1.246 -1.209
D9 -0.992 0.010 -103.910 0.000 -1.011 -0.974 -1.116 0.010 -116.410 0.000 -1.135 -1.097
D10 -0.756 0.009 -84.200 0.000 -0.774 -0.738 -0.862 0.009 -95.740 0.000 -0.879 -0.844
Notes: Log monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including transitions to zeros. In the
regressions we control for age, age squared, and calendar year fixed effects.
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Appendix C - The three-way high-dimensional fixed
effects regression model
In this Appendix we describe the procedure that allows estimation of a wage
equation that incorporates three high-dimensional fixed effects in order to be
able to identify worker, firm, and job title fixed effects. For this exercise we
need to use a modified version of the methodology initially developed by Abowd
et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002) and extended by Guimara˜es and Portugal
(2010) to work with large datasets and for three fixed effects.
The baseline specification is Equation (2).
where αi is a worker fixed effect, λj is a job title fixed effect, and θf is a
firm fixed effect. wijft represents the monthly wage for each individual i in job
j working for firm f in year t. Dkit are dummy variables where k is equal to
−m,−(m− 1), ..., 0, 1, 2, ..., which represent jointly the event of displacement.
δk represents the effect of displacement on worker’s earnings k years prior to,
and following, its occurrence. Xit controls for age and age squared for each
individual i in year t, γt are calendar year fixed effects, ijft is assumed to
follow the conventional assumptions.
In matrix format, the stacked system has the following form:
W = αF1 + λF2 + θF3 + φZ +  (6)
In this equation F1, F2, and F3 are high-dimensional matrices for the
worker, job, and firm fixed effects, respectively. Z is a matrix of the explanatory
variables and calendar year fixed effects from equation (2).
The least squares estimators of φ, α, λ, and θ solve the following equations:
Z ′Z Z ′F1 Z ′F2 Z ′F3
F ′1Z F ′1F1 F ′1F2 F ′1F3
F ′2Z F ′2F1 F ′2F2 F ′2F3
F ′3Z F ′3F1 F ′3F2 F ′3F3


φ
α
λ
θ
 =

Z ′W
F ′1W
F ′2W
F ′3W
 (7)
It is computationally difficult to invert the left matrix due to the large number
of workers, firms, and job titles. Herein we use an iterative solution that
alternates between estimation of φ, α, θ, and λ.
φ
α
λ
θ
 =

(Z ′Z)−1Z ′(W − αF1 − θF2 − λF3)
(F ′1F1)−1F ′1(W − θF2 − λF3 − φZ)
(F ′2F2)−1F ′2(W − αF1 − θF3 − φZ)
(F ′3F3)−1F ′3(W − αF1 − λF2 − φZ)

It is clear from the previous equations that at each iteration the fixed effects
are simply computed as averages of the residuals. For an example, (F ′3F3)−1F ′3
is simply a demeaning operator for the firm fixed effect. The iterative solu-
tion alternates between estimation of φ, α, λ, and θ and proceeds as follows.
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First, the algorithm makes use of the Frish-Waugh-Lovell theorem to remove
the influence of the three high-dimensional fixed effects from each individual
variable. Through the recursive algorithm the current value of φ can be used
to estimate the current value of α. In estimating λ the previous values of φ
and α are used. In estimating θ the previous values of λ, φ, and α are used.
Then the algorithm restarts and will converge because the parameter updates
are chosen according to the equations in (7). Next, we estimate the regression
using the transformed variables with a correction to the degrees of freedom.
This approach yields the exact least squares solution for the coefficients and
standard errors.
The fixed effects in equation (2) were estimated using the complete data
set, which covers the employed population in the private sector in Portugal
with all available information from 1986 to 2013 and has a total of 22,412,051
observations. The identification of the three high dimensional fixed effects given
by the worker, firm, and job title effects was circumvented by applying the
algorithm of Abowd et al. (2002), based on graph theory to determine groups
of connected individuals, firms, and job titles. A connected group exists when
at least one element of a worker, job title, and firm links the rest of the group.
The largest connected group represents more than 99 percent of the sample.
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Appendix D - Decomposition of the wage loss - dis-
placed workers due to collective dismissals
Period Base Full
relative Firm Match Job title
to displacement δbasek − δfullk fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
D−10 0.10 -0.01 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
D−9 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
D−8 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
D−7 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
D−6 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.03
D−5 0.09 -0.03 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.03
D−4 0.08 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02
D−3 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
D−2 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
D−1 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
D0 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
D1 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02
D2 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01
D3 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
D4 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
D5 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
D6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
D7 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
D8 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
D9 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
D10 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
µPre−displacement 0.08 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
µPost−displacement 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
∆ -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the two fixed effects of the
wage loss of displaced workers. In the regressions we control for age, age squared,
and calendar year fixed effects. All regressions are computed with worker fixed
effects. In each column µPre−displacement is the computed average between the first
eleven lines (D−10 to D0). µPost−displacement is the computed average between the
next ten lines (D1 to D10). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the
previous two lines.
39
